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Taxing and Tuition: A Legislative Solution to Growing 
Endowments and the Rising Costs of a College Degree 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Colleges and universities in the United States have enjoyed 
ballooning endowment growth in recent years, leading to colossal 
reserves of wealth at the most elite institutions. In September 2011, for 
example, Harvard University announced that its endowment was worth 
$32 billion after experiencing a 21% return on investments during the 
2011 fiscal year.1 Likewise, Yale’s endowment grew to $19.4 billion on 
returns of 22% over the same period.2 And while Harvard and Yale are 
easily the nation’s richest schools, they have not been alone in their good 
fortune. At the end of the 2011 fiscal year, seventy-three additional 
higher-education institutions in the United States had endowments worth 
more than $1 billion.3 
At the same time, the cost of a college degree has continued to spiral 
higher. From 2010 to 2011, tuition and fees rose by 4.5% at private, 
nonprofit colleges and more than 8% at public institutions.4 These 
figures are part of a thirty-year trend of steady increases in the sticker 
price of higher education;5 since 1986, tuition has grown by nearly 
 
 1. Gautam S. Kumar & Zoe A.Y. Weinberg, Harvard Endowment Jumps 21.4 Percent, 
HARV. CRIMSON (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2011/9/22/hmc-endowment-
returns-2011. 
 2. Tom Conroy, Investment Return of 21.9% Brings Yale Endowment Value to $19.4 
Billion, YALE NEWS, (Sept. 28, 2011), http://news.yale.edu/2011/09/28/investment-return-219-
brings-yale-endowment-value-194-billion. 
 3. NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. & UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS & COMMONFUND INSTITUTE, U.S. AND 
CANADIAN INSTITUTIONS LISTED BY FISCAL YEAR 2011 ENDOWMENT MARKET VALUE AND 
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN ENDOWMENT MARKET VALUE FROM FY 2010 TO FY 2011 (2012) 
[hereinafter NACUBO 2011 STUDY], available at http://www.nacubo.org/Documents/ 
research/2011_NCSE_Public_Tables_Endowment_Market_Values_Final_January_17_2012.pdf. 
Despite such phenomenal wealth, nearly half of all educational endowments still sit slightly below 
pre-recession levels. See University Endowments Beginning to Regain Recession Losses, CHI. SUN-
TIMES (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.suntimes.com/news/education/10350888-418/university-endow 
ments-beginning-to-regain-recession-losses.html. 
 4. SANDY BAUM & JENNIFER MA, COLL. BD. ADVOCACY & POLICY CTR., TRENDS IN 
COLLEGE PRICING 2011, 10 (2011), available at http://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files 
/College_Pricing_2011.pdf. 
 5. See id. at 13 (showing tuition and fee increases at public and private colleges and 
universities since 1982). 
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500%, far outpacing inflation6 and creating fears that college may soon 
be “out of reach for most Americans.”7 
These fears have prompted commentators to propose numerous 
endowment-related legislative reforms.8 Most have focused on 
mandatory endowment distributions,9 taxes on the endowment income of 
wealthy schools,10 increased transparency from universities regarding 
endowment use and accumulation,11 or changes to donor tax laws.12 
Despite widespread academic criticism of traditional justifications for 
endowment accumulation,13 these proposals have largely been met with 
skepticism by scholars who fear, among other things, potential  
 
 
 
 
 6. See Timothy McMahon, College Tuition & Fees vs. Overall Inflation (CPI-U) 
Cumulative Inflation Comparison, INFLATIONDATA.COM (June 14, 2012), http://inflation 
data.com/inflation/im ages/charts/Education/Education_inflation_chart.htm. 
 7. Tamar Lewin, College May Become Unaffordable for Most in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 
2008, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/03/education/03college.html. 
 8. See Sarah E. Waldeck, The Coming Showdown Over University Endowments: Enlisting 
the Donors, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1795, 1799 (2009) (“[C]ritics [of endowment accumulation] have 
floated multiple proposals for congressional action.”); Alexander M. Wolf, Note, The Problems with 
Payouts: Assessing the Proposal for a Mandatory Distribution Requirement for University 
Endowments, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 591, 591 (2011) (“[L]awmakers at the state and federal levels 
considered regulating or taxing university endowments.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, House Passes Bill Aimed at College Costs, N.Y. TIMES Feb. 
8, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/08/education/08education.html (describing a proposal, 
eventually withdrawn from a 2008 education bill, that would have forced universities “to spend at 
least 5 percent of their endowment assets each year”). 
 10. See, e.g., Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1817 (discussing various iterations of this plan); Peter 
Schworm & Matt Viser, Lawmakers Target $1B Endowments, BOS. GLOBE May 8, 2008, 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2008/05/ 
08/lawmakers_target_1b_endowments (describing a Massachusetts law that would have taxed 
colleges with endowments worth more than $1 billion). 
 11. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Senator Charles Grassley, Sen. Grassley Works to 
Build Confidence in Nonprofits with Greater Transparency (May 29, 2007) [hereinafter Grassley 
Press Release 1], available at http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel 
_dataPageID_1502=1 2581. 
 12. See, e.g., Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1818–22. 
 13. Henry Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have Endowments?, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 3, 39 
(1990) (“It is not clear . . . that the sizes of existing endowments, and the ways in which they are 
managed, are well chosen to serve [the] goals [of higher education].”); Peter Conti-Brown, Scarcity 
Amidst Wealth: The Law, Finance, and Culture of Elite University Endowments in Financial Crisis, 
63 STAN. L. REV. 699, 705 (2009) (“It is not obvious why universities maintain large capital reserves 
at all . . . .”); Walkdeck, supra note 8, at 1810 (“[U]pon close examination, the common 
justifications for mega-endowments are unpersuasive.”). 
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unintended consequences.14 Chief among these fears is the concern that 
endowment regulation would actually encourage tuition increases.15 
A solution left unaddressed in the legal literature and largely ignored 
by policymakers, however, is to link an endowment tax to tuition rates. 
Under such a proposal, the government could tax a university’s 
endowment income when the endowment grows during the same year 
that tuition at the school increases by more than inflation. Accordingly, 
as long as tuition increases do not outpace inflation, universities could 
accumulate endowment income tax-free. 
This Comment examines this policy proposal in detail. Part II begins 
by discussing the rising costs of college tuition and the growing concern 
over educational access. It then offers a brief introduction to university 
endowments and discusses the most commonly recognized justification 
for their existence and growth: intergenerational equity. This justification 
and its outgrowths have been the subjects of significant academic 
criticism, and scholars have suggested new theories for endowment 
accumulation that cut against normative arguments for awarding 
universities tax-exempt status. Part III discusses the advantages and 
criticisms of the most commonly debated policy proposals related to 
university endowments. Unfortunately, all of these proposals suffer from 
the same defect: they are unlikely to significantly impact the affordability 
of higher education. 
Thus, in Part IV, this Comment argues that tying an endowment tax 
directly to tuition increases represents a unique solution. Unlike other 
endowment-related measures, such a tax would discourage tuition hikes 
without encouraging wasteful spending. Perhaps more important, it 
would not necessarily discourage endowment growth or require cuts to 
current levels of funding for other important academic pursuits, such as 
research. This would leave room for universities to pursue traditional  
 
 
 14. See Mark J. Cowan, Taxing and Regulating College and University Endowment Income: 
The Literature’s Perspective, 34 J.C. & U.L. 507, 551 (2008) (“[T]here is not a strong theoretical 
case for imposing a tax . . . on endowments.”); Frances R. Hill, University Endowments: A 
(Surprisingly) Elusive Concept, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 581, 600 (2010) (arguing that distribution 
requirements will not increase the affordability of higher education or its operating costs); Waldeck, 
supra note 8, at 1813–18 (criticizing a mandatory spending proposal because it may affect a 
university’s spending priorities “in ways that are contrary to the overarching goal of controlling 
tuition” and expressing concern that an endowment tax could prompt tuition increases); Wolf, supra 
note 8, at 606 (“[A] distribution requirement will not improve affordability across the higher 
education sector.”). 
 15. See Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1817. 
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goals of intergenerational equity while still being closely tethered to their 
tax-exempt purposes. 
II. THE CONTROVERSY OVER ENDOWMENTS 
A. Rising Tuition and the Institutional-Wealth Gap 
Researchers have tracked movements in tuition for approximately 
thirty years.16 During that period, published college prices have 
consistently increased more rapidly than prices for other goods or 
services.17 In fact, since 1981, the average total cost, in constant dollars, 
of tuition, fees, room, and board at undergraduate institutions in the 
United States has more than doubled.18 
Unfortunately, the largest increases, particularly in recent years, have 
come at public schools, not private universities.19 Statistics from the 
Department of Education show an almost 90% spike in inflation-adjusted 
 
 16. See, e.g., BAUM & MA, supra note 4, at 8 (noting that the College Board has been 
collecting data on tuition for only a thirty-year period). 
 17. Id. An adequate explanation for this phenomenon would mostly likely require a lengthy, 
multi-factored analysis. See, e.g., R. Paul Guerre, Note, Financial Aid in Higher Education: What’s 
Wrong, Who’s Being Hurt, What’s Being Done, 17 J.C. & U.L. 483, 486–88 (1991) (listing twelve 
possible justifications for higher-education pricing practices). Such a discussion is thus outside the 
scope of this comment. It is worth noting, however, that there is a growing consensus among 
scholars that the federal government’s guaranteed student-loan program is at least partially to blame 
for tuition increases. See, e.g., ANYA KAMENETZ, DIY U: EDUPUNKS, EDUPRENEURS, AND THE 
COMING TRANSFORMATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 63 (2010) (“The liftoff of college tuition into 
the stratosphere in the past thirty years . . . is concurrent with . . . the rise of student loans . . . . [T]he 
ability to finance tuition through loans . . . has made families less sensitive to tuition increases—a 
vicious cycle that leads from rising tuition to increased debt loads back to rising tuition.”); Roger 
Roots, The Student Loan Debt Crisis: A Lesson in Unintended Consequences, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 
501, 501 (2000) (“[T]he [federal student-loan] program has interfered with the educational 
marketplace by unnecessarily causing tuitions to increase.”); Kyle L. Grant, Comment, Student 
Loans in Bankruptcy and the “Undue Hardship” Exception: Who Should Foot the Bill?, 2011 BYU 
L. REV. 819, 824 (2011) (“[A]s long as financing remains the primary revenue generator [at higher-
education institutions], universities will continue to raise their tuition.”). To the extent these scholars 
are correct, endowment accumulation could be less controversial in a world without federal student 
loans. 
 18. INST. OF EDUC. SCIENCES, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION 
STATISTICS 2010, at 493 tbl.345 (2011), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest 
/d10/tables/dt10_345.asp. 
 19. See BAUM & MA, supra note 4, at 3 (“For the fifth consecutive year, the percentage 
increase in average tuition and fees at public four-year institutions was higher than the percentage 
increase at private nonprofit institutions.”); see also, Editorial, Reining in College Tuition, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2012, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/04/opinion/reining-in-
college-tuition.html (“[T]he cost of four-year public college tuition has tripled since the 
1980s . . . .”). 
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tuition rates at public colleges and universities from 2000 to 2010.20 
Even relatively wealthy schools occasionally approve extreme tuition 
increases. In 2011, for example, California’s two public university 
systems, which together enjoy endowment funds worth more than $7 
billion,21 raised tuition and fees by a combined 21% at four-year 
institutions and a staggering 37% at two-year colleges.22 
Such instances are especially troubling because of the number of 
individuals and families affected.23 Public colleges and universities 
provide education for nearly three-quarters of the country’s students.24 
Traditionally, a core mission of these schools has been to “promote the 
well-being of communities and states,”25 but tuition increases like those 
in California can be particularly burdensome for in-state students who 
may be reluctant to pay the much higher nonresident tuition rates of other 
states’ public schools.26 
Moreover, students can easily feel “shut out by the stratospheric cost 
of private colleges.”27 While tuition increases at private institutions in 
recent years have been more moderate than those at public schools, the 
cost of a private education has long been prohibitively expensive for 
many families. Undergraduate tuition and fees at Harvard, for example, 
 
 20. INST. OF EDUC. SCIENCES, supra note 18 (showing a constant-dollar increase in tuition 
and fees from $2,506 in 1999–2000 to $4,751 in 2009–10 at public institutions). 
 21. The University of California’s (UC) endowment grew by 16.6% to $6.34 billion in 2011, 
making it the thirteenth largest in the country. NACUBO 2011 STUDY, supra note 3. The California 
State University (CSU) system’s endowment surpassed $1 billion in 2011 after enjoying investment 
gains of more than 20%. THE CAL. STATE UNIV., 2010/11 PHILANTHROPIC ANNUAL REPORT, 
http://www.calstate.edu/universityadvancement/reports/1011philanthropicsupport/endowment_mark
et.shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2012). 
 22. BAUM & MA, supra note 4, at 3. The universities blamed the increases on state funding 
cuts, while policymakers criticized the institutions for their questionable financial decisions. See 
infra notes 211–13 and accompanying text. 
 23. The CSU system, for example, serves nearly 427,000 students, while the UC system 
enrolls an additional 220,000. See THE CAL. STATE UNIV., http://www.calstate.edu/ (last visited Feb. 
21, 2012); UNIV. OF CAL., It Starts Here: UC at the Frontier, 
http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/aboutuc/welcome.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2012). 
 24. Editorial, supra note 19. 
 25. Sam Dillon, At Public Universities, Warnings of Privatization, N.Y. TIMES Oct. 16, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/16/education/16college.html. 
 26. See Jonathan D. Glater, Colleges Reduce Out-of-State Tuition to Lure Students, N.Y. 
TIMES Mar. 8, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/08/education/08states.html (“Even at 
universities that are cutting their prices for out-of-state students, which can be triple tuition for state 
residents, nonresidents still generally pay 50 percent more.”). 
 27. Paul Fain, At Public Universities: Less for More, N.Y. TIMES Oct. 26, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/01/education/edlife/01public-t.html. 
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totaled $39,849 in 2011.28 Yale’s tuition was even higher, at $40,500.29 
And Columbia University, which has the nation’s eighth largest 
endowment, at $7.79 billion,30 charges its undergraduates $45,290 per 
year.31 
These figures give rise to related concerns about “a growing 
institutional wealth gap” in higher education.32 While Harvard, Yale, 
Columbia, and a handful of other schools have multibillion-dollar 
endowments, as of 2008, more than 4,100 of the nation’s 4,500 colleges 
and universities had endowments worth less than $100 million.33 While 
even these smaller amounts represent substantial capital, commentators 
complain that the wealth disparity creates awkward tensions as poorer 
colleges attempt to compete with elite schools.34 As a 2008 New York 
Times article described, less wealthy institutions “are going into fund-
raising overdrive,” struggling to retain faculty and, in some cases, 
charging exorbitant tuition and then “scrambling to explain why their 
financial aid cannot match the most prosperous of the Ivy League.”35 
The problem, of course, is that less wealthy schools can never make 
up enough ground to compete with the Harvards and Yales of the 
academic world—at least not under the current system.36 Students at 
elite private universities are arguably more willing than their peers at less 
wealthy institutions to tolerate inflated tuition rates because of the 
relative levels of prestige that accompany their degrees. As a result, 
schools like Harvard and Yale, already blessed with extraordinary 
endowments, continue to generate massive revenue with which to fund 
important research programs, attract top faculty, improve physical 
facilities, subsidize athletic programs, and recruit the most promising 
 
 28. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, National University Rankings, http://colleges. 
usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-universities (last visited Nov. 2, 
2012). 
 29. Id. 
 30. NACUBO 2011 STUDY, supra note 3. 
 31. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, supra note 28. 
 32. Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1795. 
 33. Karen W. Arenson, Endowments Widen a Higher Education Gap, N.Y. TIMES Feb. 4, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/04/education/04endowment.html. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1803–04 (“[T]he gap in instructional spending between 
rich and poor institutions continues to grow. In the past ten years, average instructional spending at 
institutions in the top quartile of wealth has grown by 37%, while instructional spending by those 
schools in the bottom quartile has grown by only 6%. At the same time, the amount of debt carried 
by poorer institutions continues to increase.” (footnote omitted)). 
6.WILLIE.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2013 2:58 PM 
1665 Taxing and Tuition 
 1671 
students.37 As their graduates go on to secure lucrative employment and 
eventually become wealthy university donors in their own right, the 
cycle perpetuates.38 
Concerns about the costs of a college degree and the growing 
institutional wealth gap have raised questions about whether universities 
are managing their endowments appropriately. To answer such questions, 
it is important to understand what endowments are and why universities 
seek to grow them. 
B. Justifications for Endowment Growth and Criticisms of Tax-Exempt 
Status 
1. What are endowments? 
In a strictly legal sense, the term “endowment” refers to money that a 
university may not spend. That is, “[t]rue endowment funds are” given to 
a college “on the condition that the principal is to be preserved . . . .”39 
While income from endowment investments may be used to fund 
university activities, trust law requires that institutions abide by donor 
restrictions.40 Thus, as Peter Conti-Brown explains, “[i]f one gives 
money to Stanford University exclusively for the humanitarian  
 
 
 37. See Arenson, supra note 33 (“The wealthiest colleges can tap their endowments to give 
substantial financial aid to families earning $180,000 or more. They can lure star professors with 
high salaries and hard-to-get apartments. They are starting sophisticated new research laboratories, 
expanding their campuses and putting up architecturally notable buildings.”); see also Waldeck, 
supra note 8, at 1804 (“Rich colleges are able to spend ample funds on classroom instruction and 
still build campus amenities ‘like fitness centers and wireless-Internet hot spots.’ These amenities 
raise student expectations . . . . Less wealthy institutions are thus pressured to add similar amenities 
by diverting funds from other purposes, including those more directly related to education.” (quoting 
Jeffrey Selingo & Jeffrey Brainard, The Rich-Poor Gap Widens for Colleges and Students, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 7, 2006, at A1)). 
 38. As an example, Arenson’s article tells of Allan T. Demaree, a former Fortune magazine 
editor, who “gladly makes donations to Princeton University, his alma mater, even though he knows 
it has become one of the wealthiest educational institutions in the world.” Arenson, supra note 33. 
 39. J. PETER WILLIAMSON, FUNDS FOR THE FUTURE: COLLEGE ENDOWMENT MANAGEMENT 
FOR THE 1900’S, at 1-12 (1993), available at http://www.commonfund.org/ 
InvestorResources/Publications/Books/Funds%20for%20the%20future.pdf. 
 40. Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 722. A university’s total endowment is usually made up 
of “thousands of smaller endowment funds” designated by donors for specific purposes, such as 
support for a research center or library. Wolf, supra note 8, at 593. See also Cowan, supra note 14, 
at 522 (“Colleges and universities . . . claim an endowment represents thousands of separate 
accounts with specific, designated purposes, such as a named or endowed professorship, a 
scholarship, a center, etc.”). 
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elimination of the university’s squirrels . . . , and Stanford accepts the 
gift, then the university may not use that gift for any other purpose.”41 
Scholars and policymakers discuss “endowments” in their more 
colloquial sense, however, referring to an institution’s “total reserve 
funds,” which include both restricted and unrestricted sums.42 In fact, 
because elite universities tend to accumulate endowment income and 
build endowments with unrestricted gifts, studies suggest that nearly half 
of all funds considered to be part of the average private school’s 
“endowment” are unrestricted.43 Moreover, the Uniform Prudent 
Management of Institutional Funds Act, adopted in all but two states,44 
has relaxed spending rules for universities, allowing them to dip into 
“underwater” endowments (i.e., endowments worth less than their 
original gift values as a result of investment losses), subject to certain 
standards.45 Thus, in most cases, well-endowed colleges and universities 
are not meaningfully restricted in their endowment spending.46 
Considering the growing concern over tuition increases, this raises 
questions regarding universities’ tendency to accumulate, rather than 
spend, endowment income. 
2. Why do universities seek to grow endowments? 
For decades scholars have struggled to explain why universities 
strive to increase the size of their endowments—or for that matter, “why 
 
 41. Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 722. 
 42. Cowan, supra note 14 at 522; see also WILLIAMSON, supra note 39, at 1-13 (“The terms 
‘restricted’ and ‘unrestricted’ are occasionally incorrectly used as synonyms for ‘true’ and ‘quasi’ 
endowment. ‘Restricted’ properly refers not to whether principal may legally be invaded but to the 
use to which spending may be applied, regardless of whether that spending includes income only or 
both income and principal.”). 
 43. See Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 723 (“The largest endowments have only between 
50% and 60% of their funds restricted in any way.”); Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1809 (“[T]he 
NACUBO study suggests that 45% . . . of the endowment funds at private institutions are 
unrestricted.”). 
 44. UNIF. LAW COMM’N, LEGISLATIVE FACT SHEET — PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF 
INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT (2006), available at http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFact 
Sheet.aspx?title=Prudent%20Management%20of%20Institutional%20Funds%20Act. 
 45. Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 719–20. 
 46. See id. at 703 (“[T]he law does not meaningfully restrict elite universities in endowment 
spending . . . .”). In fact, scholars generally agree that universities could find ways to free up more 
endowment income if they wanted. As Professor Waldeck explains, “restrictions are partially of the 
university’s own making.” She points out that colleges and universities “exert considerable influence 
over whether gifts are restricted or unrestricted, and, if restricted, the precise terms of the 
restriction.” Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1809. 
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universities maintain large capital reserves at all.”47 Yale economist and 
law professor Henry Hansmann surveyed the issue in 1990, offering 
eleven possible explanations.48 The theory that has garnered the most 
support among scholars is the notion of intergenerational equity.49 In 
fact, most of Hansmann’s other explanations are closely related to this 
theory.50 
 a. Intergenerational equity. Intergenerational equity “captures the 
concept that our contemporary society has a relationship with both past 
and future generations and raises the question of how these relationships 
should influence our decision making today.”51 Scholars often discuss 
intergenerational equity as it relates to property law or natural 
resources,52 but economists have found its principles particularly 
appealing in the context of university endowments. As James Tobin 
explained: 
The trustees of an endowed institution are the guardians of the future 
against the claims of the present. Their task is to preserve equity among 
generations. The trustees of an endowed university like [Yale] assume 
the institution to be immortal. They want to know, therefore, the rate of 
consumption from endowment which can be sustained indefinitely. 
Sustainable consumption is their conception of permanent endowment 
income. . . . Consuming endowment income so defined means in  
 
 
 47. Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 705. 
 48. Hansmann, supra note 13. 
 49. See Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 706 (“Of the theories that Hansmann surveyed to 
explain the existence of university endowments, the idea of intergenerational equity has received the 
most attention from commentators.”). 
 50. The other theories include the needs to smooth out “lumpy funding”; realize future tax 
benefits; maintain liquidity against short-term financial reversals; provide for long-term security; 
insulate the university from outside demands; ensure that certain values are passed to future 
generations; appeal to donors’ preferences; serve the personal interests of university faculty and 
administrators; cater to the peculiar perspective of university trustees; and conform to custom or 
habit. Hansmann, supra note 13, at 19–39. Hansmann separates these theories into two categories. 
The first seven (including intergenerational equity) “all involve an appeal to the long-run best 
interests of society and, particularly, of students.” Id. at 32. Thus, these theories can appropriately be 
considered outgrowths, or at least relatives, of the notion of intergenerational equity. 
 51. Keith Aoki, Food Forethought: Intergenerational Equity and Global Food Supply—Past, 
Present, and Future, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 399, 403 (2011). 
 52. See, e.g., Edith Brown Weiss, Intergenerational Equity: Toward an International Legal 
Framework, in GLOBAL ACCORD: ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 
333 (Nazli Choucri ed., 1993); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. 
REV. 347 (1967). 
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principle that the existing endowment can continue to support the same 
set of activities that it is now supporting.53 
In the nearly forty years that have passed since Tobin made these 
statements, colleges and universities have continued to point to 
intergenerational equity as the primary justification for building 
endowments.54 Most scholars who have examined the theory, however, 
have agreed that it “provide[s] very doubtful support for current 
endowment policies.”55 
 b. Criticisms of intergenerational equity. Perhaps the most 
persuasive criticism of intergenerational equity is that it does not explain 
the actual behavior of educational institutions. Hansmann touched on this 
point, using Yale as an example. He noted that in the early half of the 
twentieth century, the school enjoyed significant increases in its 
endowment with almost no periods of dissaving.56 Yet “Yale did not 
withdraw substantial funds from its endowment to help it through the 
financial crisis of the 1970s.”57 
Recent years have seen universities repeat this pattern. Despite 
enormous endowment growth from 2000 to 2007, wealthy schools made 
deep cuts in their operating budgets during the financial crisis of 2008, 
apparently in an attempt to preserve endowment corpus.58 As Conti-
Brown has described, the five private universities with the largest 
endowments—Harvard, Yale, Stanford, Princeton, and MIT—each cut 
their budgets by up to 15% during the recession.59 Despite sitting “atop 
 
 53. James Tobin, What is Permanent Endowment Income?, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 427, 427 
(1974). 
 54. See Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 707 (discussing statements by colleges and 
universities to that effect). 
 55. Hansmann, supra note 13, at 14; see also Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the 
Democratization of Dynasty, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 873, 935 (1997) (“I agree with all of Professor 
Hansmann’s points, and the other intergenerational equity arguments against charitable 
endowments.”); Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1807 (“On the current state of the economic evidence, 
endowment spending policies do not support intergenerational equity.”). 
 56. Hansmann, supra note 13, at 24. 
 57. Id. Of course, Yale could not have withdrawn restricted funds, see supra note 39 and 
accompanying text, but there is strong evidence suggesting that a substantial portion of the school’s 
endowment would have been unrestricted at this time. Despite the recession of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, one study found that as of 1985, 38% of endowments worth more than $100 million 
were made up of unrestricted amounts. Hansmann, supra note 13, at 8. 
 58. See Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 703 (“[U]niversities—including the wealthiest in the 
country—have made significant cuts to almost every area of their budgets.”). 
 59. Id. at 702. 
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multibillion dollar endowments,” they “laid off hundreds of employees, 
froze[] salaries, halted or delayed construction projects, issued billions of 
dollars in debt, canceled or downgraded varsity sports teams, and closed 
libraries, among many other responses.”60 While these cuts may have 
been wise financial decisions, Conti-Brown points out that they are 
inconsistent with the notion of intergenerational equity: “Students 
yesterday were supposed to have benefits withheld in order to ensure that 
students today received at least the same benefits. Under the present 
practice, however, students yesterday received benefits that students 
today no longer receive, making the promise of intergenerational equity 
hollow.”61 
A related criticism is that schools tend to invoke intergenerational 
equity as a justification for creating spending policies that prioritize 
endowment growth over other important educational interests. Preserving 
the endowment corpus, for example, is an overarching goal at many elite 
universities.62 Even in years with strong investment returns, this can 
conflict with a school’s ability to fund research or keep tuition costs 
down, especially if inflation rates also increase. An example from 
Professor Evelyn Brody illustrates the complication: “If the Princeton 
[endowment investment] plan produced a 9% ‘total return’ . . . at a time 
of 5% inflation, then 4% (applied to a moving average) remains for 
spending.”63 The problem is that if 4% is insufficient to cover the 
university’s operating budget, Princeton, in the name of intergenerational 
equity, may decide to make up the difference by cutting programs or 
increasing tuition. Either choice seems like an odd result given that the 
university’s wealth actually grew during the year and may have grown 
by much larger amounts in previous years. Of course, schools can argue 
that if inflation constantly outpaces real endowment gains, endowment 
income will “finance an ever-decreasing fraction of the cost of 
 
 60. Id. at 702–03. 
 61. Id. at 708. 
 62. See id. at 737 (“The idea that an endowment must remain sacred to the university . . . has 
a long history . . . .”); Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1811 (“The endowment . . . has become the primary 
yardstick by which boards of trustees judge not just themselves, but also their top administrators.”); 
Brody, supra note 55, at 932 (discussing claims by university trustees that they are obligated to 
protect “the real value of the endowment.”). 
 63. Brody, supra note 55, at 932; see also Tobin, supra note 53, at 429 (“[U]nder idealized 
conditions the university can consume the noninflationary fraction of the earnings of the businesses 
whose securities it holds. The remainder . . . must be plowed back to enlarge the endowment enough 
to keep up with inflation.”). 
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education.”64 But this would be true only if university investments 
consistently failed to meet expectations and new gifts from donors were 
unable to make up the difference—both of which seem highly unlikely 
given the past performance of university endowments.65 
Intergenerational equity is premised on the assumption that 
universities will exist forever.66 This has attracted further criticism from 
scholars who believe this assumption encourages institutions to focus too 
little on the needs of the current generation. As economist Robert Eisner 
lamented, spending policies like the Princeton plan outlined above 
“reinforce and perpetuate the university practice of using endowments to 
build forever for the future. Jam tomorrow, but never jam today!”67 
Moreover, he argues, the idea that any school will last forever is simply 
unrealistic: 
Why should we act as if a university or any other institution is 
permanent? We know that nothing is permanent. . . . We know that 
needs change and we can anticipate that the needs for endowment 
income can change. We know that populations move and that particular 
universities may be in less demand in the future (while others may or 
may not be in greater demand). Indeed, almost nowhere in human 
behavior or in economic activity do we show a zero rate of time 
preference. We are always giving more weight to the present than to the 
future.68 
Despite these criticisms, “endowment policy continues to seek 
capital preservation, while spending only a portion of growth.”69 These 
inconsistencies have led scholars to propose new theories to account for 
university behavior. 
 c. Emerging theories. In 1990, Hansmann suggested that endowment 
accumulation might be at least partially a product of the business-minded 
 
 64. Hansmann, supra note 13, at 17. 
 65. Despite various periods of economic decline, the “total inflation-adjusted endowment 
assets held by U.S. colleges and universities grew from just over $100 billion in 1989 to about . . . 
$418 billion in 2008 . . . .” U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-393, POSTSECONDARY 
EDUCATION: COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ENDOWMENTS HAVE SHOWN LONG-TERM GROWTH, 
WHILE SIZE, RESTRICTIONS, AND DISTRIBUTIONS VARY 9 (2010), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/301008.pdf. 
 66. See Tobin, supra note 53, at 427 (“The trustees of an endowed university . . . assume the 
institution to be immortal.”). 
 67. Robert Eisner, Endowment Income: Discussion, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 438, 439 (1974). 
 68. Id. at 440. 
 69. Brody, supra note 55, at 933. 
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tendencies of university trustees.70 This explanation has garnered much 
recent support among academics.71 Conti-Brown points out, for example, 
that “because trustees come from a world where money is the primary 
benchmark of success,” they may consider endowment preservation to be 
their top priority.72 Moreover, since trustees generally have little 
experience in the academic world, they “are often in a poor position to 
exercise meaningful oversight over the actual operations of the 
institution.”73 
This helps explain a second emerging theory for endowment 
growth—that university presidents increasingly define success in terms 
of their schools’ wealth. Professor Sarah Waldeck has pointed out that 
university presidents are often “viewed as the nonprofit equivalents of 
chief executive officers, with compensation packages that reflect this 
corporate mindset.”74 She notes that in 2006, eighty-one presidents of 
private universities made at least $500,000—including twelve who 
received more than $1 million—and the largest public institutions paid 
their presidents comparable amounts.75 Such salaries would have been 
“inconceivable just twenty years ago.”76 
These changes reflect academia’s growing connection to the 
corporate world. In some cases, universities have shown a preference for 
hiring former business executives, rather than professors, to serve as 
presidents,77 perhaps as a result of higher education’s emphasis on 
fundraising.78 In fact, college rankings, like those published by U.S. 
News and World Report, are often based in part on institutional wealth.79 
 
 70. Hansmann, supra note 13, at 37. 
 71. See, e.g., Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 738 (“The incentives and backgrounds of 
university administrators—ultimately those who make the decisions about endowment spending—
may have much to do with a hypothesized view that the endowment must be preserved at all costs.”); 
Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1810–11 (citing Hansmann, supra note 13, at 37) (“Just as outside 
observers use the endowment as a proxy for institutional success, boards of trustees are inclined to 
use the size of the endowment as a measure of their success in managing the university.”). 
 72. Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 738. 
 73. Hansmann, supra note 13, at 37. 
 74. Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1811. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 738–39 (“It has long been noted that the role of the 
university president is largely one of increasing the financial clout of the institution, usually by 
fundraising.”). 
 79. See Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1810 (“The factors that are typically relevant when 
evaluating a college . . . have values that are at best subjective. In contrast, the value of an 
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This helps explain why “[a] university president who oversees a decline 
in the endowment will not . . . be considered a successful president.”80 
Conti-Brown hypothesizes that “an intentional spending down of the 
endowment could cast a pall of failure on the president that could last for 
years. . . . This could explain the heavy bias toward resolving budgetary 
crises with budgetary disruption rather than with endowment 
disruption.”81 
A third emerging theory simply speculates that universities seek to 
grow endowments out of habit. As Professor Waldeck explains, 
endowment accumulation may have been a priority for so long that 
administrators simply “have not paused to consider whether it is still 
rational . . . .”82 It might seem far-fetched to believe that “institutions . . . 
at the epicenter of American intellectual life” would ignore a question so 
important to the long-term interests of students and society.83 But as 
Professor Waldeck points out, “when so much emphasis has been placed 
on the endowment, and for so long, at some point the endowment begins 
to become the university . . . [and] criticism[s] of endowment spending 
policies are perceived as striking at the very heart of the institution.”84 
Endowment building out of “habit,” then, is meant to suggest not that 
universities have purposely chosen to ignore the question of whether 
increasing their wealth serves society’s best interests, but rather that the 
issue has become distorted by tradition. As Professor Waldeck observes, 
“a retreat from existing spending policies may seem tantamount to a 
confession of professional misjudgment. This provides all the more 
reason for mega-endowment institutions to hunker down and defend 
spending (or not spending) as usual.”85 
Much of the controversy surrounding endowment building depends 
on which set of theories proffers the best explanation for universities’ 
financial behavior. Under the intergenerational equity model, current 
students must sacrifice only that portion of endowment income that is 
necessary to offer equal educational access and services to successive 
generations—a relatively uncontroversial notion. The emerging theories 
 
endowment is a concrete measure of a university’s success.”); Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 740 
(“The absolute size of an endowment provides a clear criterion for objective ranking.”). 
 80. Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 739. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1810. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1812. 
 85. Id. 
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outlined above, however, suggest far less socially beneficial motivations 
for endowment accumulation. Accordingly, they call into question the 
tax-exempt status of higher-education institutions. 
3. Criticisms of tax-exempt status 
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts from 
federal taxation any entity “organized and operated exclusively for 
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or 
educational purposes.”86 Because universities are engaged in 
“educational” pursuits, policymakers assume their funds—whether spent 
now or in the future—will be used to further the institutions’ tax-exempt 
purposes. As a result, until relatively recently, observers have not 
seriously questioned higher education’s favorable tax treatment, even 
when they have questioned the motives behind endowment 
accumulation.87 
Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status may be inappropriate, however, 
if intergenerational equity and related theories for endowment growth do 
not adequately explain university behavior. As Hansmann pointed out, 
these traditional theories “involve an appeal to the long-run best interests 
of society and, particularly, of students.”88 Thus, they are consistent with 
the requirement in Section 501(c)(3) that universities be engaged in 
educational pursuits. The emerging theories outlined above, on the other 
hand, “involve no such social welfare argument.”89 Instead, they fall into 
a second category of theories that “suggest[s] that endowments may be at 
least in part a consequence of self-interested or short-sighted action by 
the individuals who support or manage universities.”90 In other words, 
these theories view endowment building as the pursuit of profit 
essentially for profit’s sake, rather than to further educational pursuits.91 
To the extent that these emerging theories accurately explain endowment  
 
 
 86. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 87. See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 13, at 40 (“[I]t would be premature to propose changes 
in the law governing endowment accumulation and, in particular, to propose measures to limit the 
discretion of universities to accumulate large endowments.”). 
 88. Id. at 32. 
 89. Id. at 33. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 741 (“[T]he value of the endowment, to the extent 
that it burnishes the university’s reputation, becomes not simply a means of accomplishing other, 
more traditional university missions, but an end in and of itself.”). 
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accumulation, they cut against normative arguments for awarding higher-
education institutions full tax-exempt status.92 
 a. Nonprofit vs. for-profit. Debates about which set of theories best 
explains endowment building are difficult to resolve, largely because 
there is conflicting evidence on whether nonprofit higher-education 
institutions have actually crossed a for-profit line. On one hand, scholars 
in recent years have lamented the tendency among endowed universities 
to stray from their educational missions in pursuit of revenue 
generation.93 Sheila Slaughter and Gary Rhoades, for example, have 
coined the phrase “academic capitalism” to describe how “[p]ublic and 
nonprofit institutions increasingly engage in market and market-like 
activities.”94 As the country’s economy has become more information-
oriented, they argue, colleges and universities have begun prioritizing 
revenue generation above other values.95 As examples, they cite the 
growing emphasis on patent-producing—as opposed to publication-
producing—scientific research; the increasing number of courses that can 
be taught by graduate assistants or adjuncts; the preference for expanding 
distance learning and other forms of educational access for employed 
business people rather than the socioeconomically disadvantaged; and 
the increased focus on generating profits from copyrightable educational 
materials.96 
These practices illustrate what many see as a blurring of the 
nonprofit/for-profit line in higher education. Elite schools, once 
considered havens of “ethereal excellence, wisdom, and morality,” are 
“steadily metamorphosing into lucrative enterprises.”97 Former Harvard 
 
 92. See Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1812 (“[W]hen the university’s proffered justifications for 
its spending policies are unconvincing, and when other plausible explanations do not warrant 
deference, Congress needs to rethink its tax treatment of university endowments.”). The purpose of 
this Comment is not to resolve this theoretical debate. In fact, a combination of theories—some 
consistent with tax-exempt status and some devoid of social-welfare arguments—might better 
explain endowment growth than any single theory could alone. Rather, the point here is to highlight 
what research is increasingly showing: that traditional justifications for endowment growth do not 
fully account for university behavior. 
 93. See id. at 1805 (discussing the concept of “mission drift”). 
 94. SHEILA SLAUGHTER & GARY RHOADES, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM AND THE NEW 
ECONOMY: MARKETS, STATE, AND HIGHER EDUCATION 4 (2004); see also Gary Rhoades & Sheila 
Slaughter, Academic Capitalism in the New Economy: Challenges and Choices, 1 AM. ACAD. 37, 37 
(2004), available at http://www.aft.org/pdfs/highered/academic/june04/Rhoades.qxp.pdf. 
 95. Rhoades & Slaughter, supra note 94, at 38. 
 96. Id. at 39–45. 
 97. Oksana Koltko, Comment, Chasing Profits—Disregarding Values: Legal Persona of 
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University president Derek Bok has written extensively on this 
“commercialization” of higher education. He explains: 
Universities learned that they could sell the right to use their scientific 
discoveries to industry and find corporations willing to pay a tidy sum 
to sponsor courses delivered by Internet or cable television. Apparel 
firms offered money to have colleges place the corporate logo on their 
athletic uniforms or, conversely, to put the university’s name on caps 
and sweatshirts sold to the public. Faculty members began to bear such 
titles as Yahoo Professor of Computer Science or K-Mart Professor of 
Marketing. The University of Tennessee, in a coup of sorts, reportedly 
sold its school color to a paint company hoping to find customers 
wishing to share in the magic of the college’s football team by daubing 
their homes with “Tennessee Orange.” One enterprising university even 
succeeded in finding advertisers willing to pay for the right to place 
their signs above the urinals in its men’s rooms.98 
Although such commercialization efforts are not new to higher 
education, “the size of the accumulated funds . . . , the techniques 
employed to attract and multiply these funds, the types of . . . institutions 
engrossed in the corporatization processes, and the level of concentration 
on . . . profit-generation are new.”99 
On the other hand, revenue generated from commercialization can 
provide significant educational benefits to students and society; thus, 
commercialization does not necessarily require a change in the way 
universities are treated under the tax code (although scholars have argued 
that in certain cases it should100). In fact, Congress has traditionally 
refrained from placing conditions on nonprofit institutions’ tax-exempt 
status unless “there was reason to doubt that [the institutions were] using 
their funds for exempt activities.”101 Professor Frances R. Hill argues 
that no such doubts exist with colleges and universities, since even 
undistributed endowment funds can be considered “money in use,” or 
money contributing to universities’ educational pursuits.102 Because an 
 
Elite Schools and Their Destructive Tax-Exempt Status, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1073, 1074 (2009). 
 98. DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION 2 (2003). 
 99. Koltko, supra note 97, at 1075. 
 100. See, e.g., Peter D. Blumberg, Comment, From “Publish or Perish” to “Profit or Perish”: 
Revenues from University Technology Transfer and the § 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption, 145 U. PA. L. 
REV. 89, 139–42 (1996) (arguing that the unrelated business income tax should be expanded to cover 
certain types of technology transfers from universities to the private sector). 
 101. Hill, supra note 14, at 581. 
 102. Id. at 585. 
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endowment produces income for current university operations and 
enhances a school’s ability to secure financing and make long-term 
budgeting plans, she contends that the endowment furthers the goals of 
higher education even when income from it is saved rather than 
distributed.103 
 
b. The fine line. Unlike much of the legal literature on this subject, 
this Comment does not attempt to disregard either side of the tax debate. 
Rather, the purpose here is to stress that any endowment-related policy 
worthy of consideration should take account of the competing 
motivations underlying university revenue-generation practices. Those 
motivations are meaningful for tax purposes not because endowment 
building cannot further educational goals (in fact, the opposite is often 
true), but rather because endowment building is consistent with the 
501(c)(3) exemption only if it is done with an eye toward producing a 
higher-quality and less-expensive education for students. Ideally, 
regulation in this area will walk a fine line, discouraging endowment 
accumulation when it decreases educational access or violates principles 
of intergenerational equity, but endorsing endowment-building activities 
that are consistent with tax-exempt educational purposes. As the 
following section describes, the most commonly proposed endowment 
policies have not lived up to this ideal. 
III. ENDOWMENT POLICY PROPOSALS AND THEIR CRITICISMS 
The debate over university endowments has led to four proposals for 
potential legislation: (A) impose a minimum spending requirement on 
universities; (B) impose a tax on the investment income of well-endowed 
schools; (C) require more transparency from universities regarding their 
endowment spending and accumulation practices; and (D) modify donor-
tax laws to indirectly influence university behavior. Each of these 
proposals is designed to encourage schools to spend more of their 
endowments, but each suffers from several serious flaws. 
A. Mandatory Distribution Requirement 
The proposal that has garnered the most attention among 
policymakers—and by far the most academic criticism—is to impose a 
distribution requirement, or “mandatory payout,” on educational 
 
 103. Id. 
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endowments.104 Under this measure, universities would be forced to 
annually spend a certain percentage of their assets.105 Most iterations of 
the proposal have been modeled on the five-percent spending rule 
applicable to nonprofit foundations,106 although some have argued the 
percentage should be even higher.107 
While a five-percent rule would force most universities to spend 
more of their endowment than they currently do,108 because the proposal 
does not necessarily encourage the right kind of spending, scholars fear it 
could do more damage than good.109 As one economist opined, if elite 
schools spend endowment primarily to attract more prestigious faculty 
and build expensive facilities, a spending rule “would have the 
unintended consequence[] of accelerating the academic arms race.”110 
That is, as wealthy universities improve existing amenities, poorer 
schools may feel pressured to mimic their expenditures.111 Rather than 
lowering the cost of a college degree, “such a policy might ultimately 
 
 104. See Wolf, supra note 8, at 591–92 (“The proposal that gained the widest traction would 
have required universities to spend at least five percent of their assets each year—a ‘mandatory 
payout.’”). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See, e.g., Charles E. Grassley, Wealthy Colleges Must Make Themselves More 
Affordable, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (D.C.), May 30, 2008, at A36 [hereinafter Grassley Press 
Release 2], available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/release/?id=c1b59ac6-
5fb9-4770-8050-10c4e99d8b1e (arguing that a five-percent distribution rule is not too prescriptive 
for universities because private foundations must meet this same requirement, and they are 
“thriving”). 
 107. See, e.g., RICHARD VEDDER, CTR. FOR COLL. AFFORDABILITY & PRODUCTIVITY, 
FEDERAL TAX POLICY REGARDING UNIVERSITIES: ENDOWMENTS AND BEYOND 15 (2008), available 
at http://www. centerforcollegeaffordability.org/uploads/Endowment_Report.pdf (“A 5 percent 
spending rule seems extremely conservative.”). 
 108. The average spending rate across all higher-education institutions in 2011 was 4.6% of 
endowment value. NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. & UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS & COMMONFUND INST., 2011 
NACUBO-COMMONFUND STUDY OF ENDOWMENTS: AVERAGE ANNUAL EFFECTIVE SPENDING 
RATES, 2011 TO 2002 (2012), available at http://www.nacubo.org/Documents/research/ 
2011_NCSE_Public_Tables _Spending_Rates_Final_January_18_2012.pdf. 
 109. See, e.g., Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1816 (“Although proponents of mandatory spending 
see it as a means of reducing tuition, a five-percent rule may affect a university’s spending priorities, 
sometimes in ways that are contrary to the overarching goal of controlling tuition.”); Wolf, supra 
note 8, at 622 (“[T]he payout will have harmful consequences, including accelerating the academic 
arms race . . . and hindering colleges’ ability to respond to economic fluctuations.”). 
 110. VEDDER, supra note 107, at 20 (emphasis omitted); see also Wolf, supra note 8, at 613–
14 (“The term ‘arms race’ in the academic context typically refers to the competition between 
schools to attract the top students by providing the best educational opportunities—as well as the 
best dormitories, dining halls, and athletic facilities (although some have also used the term more 
generally to explain the competition for top faculty and, in the end, for prestige).”). 
 111. VEDDER, supra note 107, at 20. 
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increase the use of resources by society for higher education, with 
dubious payoffs in terms of outcomes.”112 
Moreover, there is concern that a spending requirement 
simultaneously demands too much and too little from universities, 
depending on their particular circumstances. During periods of poor 
investment performance, for example, a five-percent rule could lead “to 
real endowment declines at many American institutions.”113 On the other 
hand, while the requirement is “intended to act as a floor for spending,” 
some fear it could become “a ceiling, with institutions opting never to 
spend at a higher rate.”114 
Perhaps more important, a spending rule could create awkward 
internal conflicts for universities. It seems doubtful that such a rule 
would change higher education’s preoccupation with endowment 
building, for example, which means schools may seek additional sources 
of revenue to make up for their extra spending.115 This could tempt 
otherwise-conservative universities to engage in risky endowment 
management strategies or, worse, simply “rais[e] tuition across the 
board.”116 
B. Taxing Large Endowments 
An alternative to the five-percent spending rule is to tax the 
endowment income of wealthy schools.117 Based on an average 
investment return of 15.3%, a 2007 study found that applying a 35% 
income tax rate to the 765 university endowments included in the study 
could result in $18 billion in annual federal revenue.118 Under one 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 16. 
 114. Wolf, supra note 8, at 620. 
 115. See Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1815 (“Even in a world of mandatory spending, 
universities are likely to try to maintain the size of their endowments.”). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. at 1817 (“Another idea is to make endowment investment returns subject to the 
corporate income tax.”). Some scholars have also discussed the possibility of combining taxes with 
spending requirements. See, e.g., VEDDER, supra note 107, at 21 (“For example, if college A faces a 
5.4 percent spending requirement from its endowment but spends only 4.4 percent, a 20 percent tax 
on the difference between 4.4 and 5.4 percent (0.2 percent of the endowment’s value) could be 
imposed.”). A few policymakers have even proposed going a step further and simply imposing 
assessments based on total endowment value, whether or not a university’s wealth is growing or 
shrinking. See Schworm & Viser, supra note 10 (describing a Massachusetts plan that would have 
applied a 2.5% assessment on university endowments worth more than $1 billion). 
 118. JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TAX ISSUES AND UNIVERSITY 
ENDOWMENTS 3 (Aug. 20, 2007) [hereinafter GRAVELLE MEMORANDUM], 
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proposal, Congress could develop a revenue-sharing plan and use this 
money to curb the higher-education wealth gap.119 A less complicated 
suggestion is to earmark the funds for financial aid.120 
Unfortunately, while these proposals offer advantages that 
mandatory distribution requirements fail to provide,121 they also raise 
concerns regarding potential unintended consequences. Critics have 
argued, for example, that if Congress uses tax revenue to fund federal 
financial-aid programs, schools “can capture the benefit by raising tuition 
or by offsetting internal financial aid (or both).”122  
To illustrate, assume that tuition at College A is $2,000 per year. If 
Congress gives students a 100% tax credit for the first $3,000 they spend 
annually in tuition and fees, College A can raise its rates by $1,000 at no 
cost to its students.123 While this may help poorer schools close the 
institutional-wealth gap, scholars fear such a transfer of federal-tax 
dollars to public colleges will discourage state funding of higher 
education.124 Moreover, the side effect of higher tuition rates could 
actually fuel additional university spending in other areas. According to 
one study of public colleges, “every $1 in higher tuition charges is 
associated with roughly $2 in higher salaries for full professors.”125 
More broadly, proposals for both mandatory-payout requirements 
and endowment taxes involve uncomfortable and potentially arbitrary 
decisions about universities’ relative wealth.126 Policymakers have 
indicated, for example, that “[a]ny legislation would probably apply only 
to institutions with absolute endowments valued above a certain floor, 
 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/news room/ranking/download/?id=f2ca39c7-f9e7-4ce0-8e76-
2918f9758087.  
 119. Herbert A. Allen, Op-Ed., Gold in the Ivory Tower, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/21/opinion/21allen.html. 
 120. See Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1817 (“The most straightforward [plan] would earmark the 
funds generated for congressional measures designed to alleviate tuition costs.”). 
 121. See id. (noting that the tax would apply only when investments produced a profit and 
would not require universities to dip into underwater endowment funds). 
 122. Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 TENN. 
L. REV. 687, 709 (1999). 
 123. See id. at 709 n.86 (discussing essentially the same example). 
 124. See Michael S. McPherson & Morton Owen Schapiro, Financing Undergraduate 
Education: Designing National Policies, 50 NAT’L TAX J. 557, 564 (1997) (discussing a similar 
proposal by President Clinton and concluding that it could “create an environment that encourages 
further withdrawal of state support”). 
 125. VEDDER, supra note 107, at 19. 
 126. See Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1799 (“With such a wide range of endowment values, one 
threshold question is: which institutions are truly wealthy?”). 
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such as $500 million or $1 billion.”127 But focusing on absolute 
endowment size is problematic because research expenses, enrollment 
numbers, and tuition rates vary greatly by school.128 Proposals based on 
an “endowment-to-expense” ratio would produce fairer results, but this 
basis has problems of its own, partly because universities could easily 
manipulate data to avoid a potential tax or regulation.129 A few scholars 
have settled on an “endowment-per-student” ratio as the best of both 
worlds,130 but they acknowledge that even this acts as an imperfect 
measure of relative wealth.131 Thus, any tax based on endowment size is 
inherently problematic and could lead to unfair outcomes. 
C. Increased Transparency 
A less controversial proposal simply calls for more transparency 
from colleges and universities regarding endowment spending and 
accumulation practices.132 The Internal Revenue Service already requires 
tax-exempt organizations to annually fill out Form 990, which includes 
questions regarding employee compensation, revenue, and expenses,133 
but some policymakers argue that the form should be amended to require 
more endowment-specific information.134 
 
 
 127. Wolf, supra note 8, at 599. 
 128. As Professor Waldeck notes, “[t]he primary value of an endowment stems from its ability 
to subsidize university operations.” Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1800. Thus, the smaller the college, 
and the less ambitious its research agenda, the less total endowment it needs. 
 129. See id. at 1801 (“[O]ne can . . . imagine a series of Enron-like maneuvers designed to 
manipulate the ratio.”). 
 130. VEDDER, supra note 107, at 13 (“The size of endowment needs to be related to the size of 
the student body to ascertain resources available per student.”); see Wolf, supra note 8, at 1802 (“As 
Congress considers which institutions genuinely have an excessive endowment, the amount of 
endowment per full-time student will be its most useful measure.”). 
 131. See, e.g., Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1801 (“[T]he measure is not as sensitive [to 
institutional costs] as the endowment-expense ratio.”). 
 132. See, e.g., GRAVELLE MEMORANDUM, supra note 118, at 14 (“Disseminating better 
information on what higher-education institutions are doing with their endowments . . . could be 
helpful.”). 
 133. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2011 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 
990 RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX 22, 33, 38 (2011), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990.pdf. 
 134. See Grassley Press Release 1, supra note 11 (“The public needs to understand clearer 
what is the endowment of the charity . . . ; what those endowment funds are being spent on; the 
amount and percentage of the endowment being spent; how those endowment funds are being 
invested; the size of the endowment; what endowment funds are earmarked for specific purposes and 
what are those purposes; and, the costs of the management of the endowment.”). 
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There is nothing particularly problematic about such proposals 
(although the more information required of universities, the more money 
they will be forced to divert from educational pursuits to regulatory 
compliance).135 In fact, universities might feel pressured to distribute 
more of their endowment income if they know the public has access to 
information about the way they manage their wealth.136 It is not clear, 
however, that more transparency, by itself, would have a significant 
effect on educational access or tuition costs.137 
There may even be a slight danger that increased transparency could 
prompt more endowment accumulation. Given university administrators’ 
inclination toward preserving endowment corpus,138 they may be 
interested to know how little they can spend without falling out of line 
with peer institutions. This could spark a race to the bottom in higher 
education. 
D. Changes in Donor Tax Laws 
A more creative proposal focuses on indirectly influencing 
endowment spending by targeting donors. Professor Waldeck has 
suggested, for example, that Congress could deny tax deductions for gifts 
to universities that are restricted for more than twenty-five years.139 It 
could also cap deductions on donations for buildings, machinery or other 
amenities that fuel spending arms races.140 The combined effect of these 
changes, she argues, would be to “encourage present spending and help 
direct donors away from gifts that may inadvertently contribute to the 
rising costs of education.”141 
 
 135. See Stephanie Strom, I.R.S. Seeks More Charity Transparency, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 15, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/15/washington/15charity.html (quoting Trent Stamp, 
president of Charity Navigator) (“Greater transparency will mean more work for charities . . . .”); cf. 
Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1816 (“While a revised Form 990 may cost more to complete, such 
expenditures are unlikely to be a significant factor in a university budget.”) 
 136. Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1816; see also Cowan, supra note 14, at 552 (“[A]dditional 
disclosure requirements could pressure colleges and universities to better monitor their endowment 
policies.”). 
 137. See, e.g., Koltko, supra note 97, at 1098 (“It is unreasonable to expect necessary changes 
in the operation of law simply from a more detailed report to the enforcement authority.”). 
 138. See supra notes 70–85 and accompanying text. 
 139. Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1818. She would only deny deductions for gifts to “mega-
endowment institution[s].” Id. 
 140. Id. at 1818–19. 
 141. Id. at 1818. 
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The legal community has largely ignored this solution,142 most likely 
because it has the potential to decrease the overall pool of money 
available for higher education. Professor Waldeck admits that her 
proposals could “cause some donors to reevaluate whether to give to 
mega-endowment universities,” but she points to the many 
noneducational charities that could receive donations in these schools’ 
stead.143 The problem is that this argument ignores the very reason for 
considering endowment-related reforms in the first place. Endowment 
building has become controversial only because schools have failed to 
meaningfully restrain the rising costs of a college education.144 The fact 
that some schools may be “hoarding” endowment income does not mean 
that higher education as a whole is overfunded. 145 On the contrary, 
concerns over rising tuition and decreased state funding evidence the 
need for more donations, not fewer.146 To enact reforms that divert 
money away from colleges and universities would only make education 
more expensive for students. 
 
 142. See id. (“Neither Congress nor commentators have identified donors as a potential means 
of encouraging endowment spending . . . . The relative silence about donors is curious.”). But see 
VEDDER, supra note 107, at 18 (“Those wanting incremental endowment spending to meet 
instructional or research needs could achieve their objective by restricting tax-exempt donations and 
investment income to those areas.”). 
 143. Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1822. 
 144. See GRAVELLE MEMORANDUM, supra note 118, at 1 (noting that the memorandum was 
in response to requests for information regarding endowment growth and how distributions from 
endowments could slow tuition increases); Cowan, supra note 14, at 508 (“[S]ome have called on 
colleges and universities to stop ‘hoarding’ their endowment income and to begin using the funds to 
increase student aid and limit tuition increases.”); Karen W. Arenson, Senate Looking at 
Endowments as Tuition Rises, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/25/ 
education/25endowments.html (“The Senate Finance Committee, increasingly concerned about the 
rising cost of higher education, demanded detailed information . . . from . . . universities on how they 
. . . managed and spent their endowments.”). 
 145. See Offshore Tax Issues, Reinsurance and Hedge Funds: Hearings Before the S. Comm. 
on Finance, 110th Cong. 15 (2007) [hereinafter Finance Committee Hearing] (statement of Lynne 
Munson, Center for College Affordability and Productivity), available at 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/?id=ddb36aa0-beb0-e2f8-275e-13625c509939 
(“[I]n too many cases, this wealth is being hoarded instead of shared.”). 
 146. See MARCEL HERBST, FINANCING PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES: THE CASE OF PERFORMANCE 
FUNDING 3 (2009) (“The prospects for higher education funding are generally dim: costs of higher 
education often rise faster than inflation; and economic development and . . . state revenues from 
taxes . . . are lagging behind because of the traditionally long periods which separate investments in 
education from subsequent economic prosperity.”); Dillon, supra note 25 (“Taxpayer support for 
public universities, measured per student, has plunged more precipitously since 2001 than at any 
time in two decades . . . .”). 
6.WILLIE.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2013 2:58 PM 
1665 Taxing and Tuition 
 1689 
E. The Need for a New Solution 
The foregoing proposals share a common defect: they are unlikely to 
significantly impact the affordability of higher education. In fact, in 
many cases, they could result in larger tuition bills for students. Effective 
congressional reform, if it is possible, must include measures that 
increase educational access.147 At the same time, to be consistent with 
the theory of intergenerational equity, endowment legislation should not 
unnecessarily inhibit universities’ ability to save for the future. The next 
section discusses a potential solution designed to satisfy both of these 
criteria. 
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Few scholars have addressed the possibility of linking an endowment 
tax to increases in tuition,148 but this measure could offer many of the 
benefits of the foregoing proposals while avoiding a number of their 
major drawbacks. This section sets forth the mechanics of such a tax in 
detail and discusses both its unique advantages and potential weaknesses. 
While any endowment-related regulation is sure to attract opposition 
from those who benefit from the status quo in higher education, the 
arguments supporting this solution merit additional consideration by both 
academics and policymakers. 
A. A Tuition-Driven Tax 
Part of the appeal of linking an endowment tax to tuition is its 
simplicity. Rather than draw arbitrary lines separating “wealthy” and 
“other” universities or debate about the basis used to draw those lines,149 
 
 147. See Grassley Press Release 2, supra note 106 (“[C]olleges are obliged to carry out the 
charitable purpose of providing the best education to the most students at the lowest cost.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 148. Jane Gravelle briefly mentioned the possibility in a Congressional Research memo in 
August 2007, and again at a hearing before the Senate Finance Committee a month later. See 
GRAVELLE MEMORANDUM, supra note 118, at 15 (“Taxes could also be imposed on endowments if 
institutions increased their tuition by more than an appropriate rate such as inflation . . . .”); Finance 
Committee Hearing, supra note 145, at 15 (“Another option, if the public policy concern is about 
affordable education, would be to impose a tax on the endowment for schools with tuition increases 
over a pre-determined threshold.”). These comments attracted little attention from other 
commentators, however, who have remained much more focused on the proposals discussed in Part 
III, supra. 
 149. See supra notes 126–31 and accompanying text. 
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the government would simply tax all schools150 that increase tuition by 
more than inflation in the same year that their endowments grow.151 
Conversely, as long as tuition increases do not outpace inflation,152 
universities could accumulate endowment income tax-free, with no 
minimum spending requirement.153 Likewise, if poor economic 
conditions cause endowment values to decrease, schools could use 
tuition increases to help weather the storm without incurring tax 
liability.154 The government could make reporting, monitoring, and 
enforcement relatively simple by revising Form 990.155 
Perhaps Congress’s most challenging task would be to define 
“endowment” broadly to include schools’ “total reserve funds.”156 A 
typical endowment is made up of “thousands of separate accounts with 
specific, designated purposes,”157 and an endowment tax could provide a 
 
 150. The tax would apply to both private and public universities. At first glance, this might 
appear to implicate federalism concerns, since public colleges are “exempt from the federal income 
tax by virtue of being part of the state government.” Cowan, supra note 14, at 511. As Cowan points 
out, however, “[t]he private/public distinction . . . is not particularly critical when analyzing whether 
endowment income should be taxed or regulated,” in part because public universities’ endowments 
“are normally not held by the state institutions themselves. Rather, endowments are raised, managed, 
and distributed by ‘supporting organizations’ that independently qualify for tax exemption as § 
501(c)(3) organizations.” Id. at 511–12. 
 151. Ideally, inflation would be measured using a government-compiled index, such as the 
Consumer Price Index. Vedder notes that “[c]olleges and universities argue for using the Higher 
Education Price Index” (HEPI), but he calls this “totally inappropriate” since this index “is largely 
determined by input prices in higher education.” VEDDER, supra note 107, at 17. The problem with 
HEPI is that when administrative costs go up—because schools give employees excessive pay raises, 
for example—HEPI also rises. Colleges could thus use it to “claim that ‘higher education costs are 
soaring,’ and demand larger government subsidies.” Id. 
 152. During periods of deflation, the legislation should probably require only that universities 
keep tuition rates flat; demanding tuition decreases could be problematic from a planning and 
budgeting standpoint. In any case, this point is of little consequence; since 1950, the average year-to-
year Consumer Price index has declined only twice. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF LABOR, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX HISTORY TABLE, available at 
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/ cpiai.txt. 
 153. Congress may also need to include provisions that prevent schools from avoiding the tax 
by substituting higher room and board charges for tuition increases. See GRAVELLE MEMORANDUM, 
supra note 118, at 16 (“Such approaches would probably also have to extend to room and board, to 
prevent increasing these payments as a substitute.”). Room and board increases arguably do not pose 
as serious a threat as tuition hikes, however, since students at many schools can opt to live off 
campus. 
 154. Thus, unlike proposals for mandatory payouts—which require minimum levels of 
spending regardless of endowment performance—this tax would protect universities whose 
investments perform poorly. 
 155. See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 157. Cowan, supra note 14, at 522. 
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perverse incentive for colleges and universities to rearrange these 
accounts in creative ways or revise their own definitions of what 
constitutes endowment funds in order to avoid application of the tax. A 
potential solution would be to use the definition of “endowment” in IRS 
Form 14018 as a model.158 
The government distributed Form 14018 to 400 colleges and 
universities in 2008 in an effort to obtain detailed information regarding 
how the schools manage their financial affairs.159 The form adopts an 
overarching, and somewhat circular, definition of endowment assets to 
encompass “the total of all long-term endowments held for the 
institution’s benefit including those held by others such as 
foundations.”160 It then divides “endowments” into three categories: (1) 
“true endowments,” defined as “gifts to the endowment pool of which 
only the return on the principal investment can be spent”; (2) “quasi 
endowments,” defined as endowment funds “of which the principal can 
be spent at the discretion of the institution’s trustees”; and (3) “term 
endowments,” defined as endowment funds “of which the principal can 
be spent after its defined ‘term’ has passed.”161 Because these three 
categories essentially capture all restricted and unrestricted endowment 
funds, this definition would make it difficult for universities to avoid the 
tax by redefining or rearranging their endowment accounts.162 
In most instances, limiting tuition increases would represent 
universities’ least expensive response to the tax.163 Where exceptions 
 
 158. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FORM 14018: COMPLIANCE 
QUESTIONNAIRE COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 21 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/sample_cucp_questionnaire.pdf [hereinafter FORM 14018]. 
 159. MALVERN J. GROSS, JR. ET AL., FINANCIAL AND ACCOUNTING GUIDE FOR NOT-FOR-
PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 224 (7th ed. Supp. 2010). 
 160. FORM 14018, supra note 158, at 21. 
 161. Id. 
 162. A potential alternative would be to simply define a university’s “endowment” to include 
all money invested in a common pool with “true endowment” funds. Because most schools group 
endowment accounts together and manage them as a single investment pool, Cowan, supra note 14, 
at 522, and because a large portion of this pool is likely to be made up of “true endowment” funds, 
this approach would probably capture the vast majority of schools’ total reserve funds. Institutions 
hoping to avoid the tax by rearranging their accounts would be forced to remove unrestricted money 
from the pool and forego the investment benefits it provides. Because they could respond by creating 
a second investment pool for unrestricted funds, however, the definition in Form 14018, while more 
cumbersome, is arguably less problematic. 
 163. See GRAVELLE MEMORANDUM, supra note 118, at 15–16 (“[T]he tax could easily be 
small and yet induce institutions to cut back tuition increases. . . . [A] tuition increase for Harvard 
was only 0.1% of its endowment, so it would clearly prefer to limit tuition increases rather than be 
exposed to even a small endowment tax.”). Tuition increases at all thirty schools which Gravelle 
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exist, however, Congress could assess endowment income at the federal 
corporate rate. Because this rate is progressive,164 less wealthy colleges 
with smaller investment returns would pay less tax than schools like 
Harvard and Yale. 
Unlike other proposals,165 the point of this solution is not to generate 
substantial tax revenue from university endowments, but rather to 
encourage endowment behavior that promotes educational access. 
Nevertheless, Congress could use what little funding the measure might 
produce to develop a revenue-sharing plan designed to benefit the 
neediest institutions.166 This would “allow the poor schools back into the 
competition for the best teachers and students” with only minimal impact 
on wealthy universities.167 It would also give poor colleges that pay the 
tax a chance to regain a portion of their losses. 
B. Advantages 
Linking an endowment tax to tuition increases offers several unique 
advantages. Like the other proposals discussed in Part III, the tax would 
encourage universities to distribute more of their wealth, but unlike those 
proposals, it would focus that distribution on college affordability. This 
would de-incentivize spending “arms races”168 by prioritizing tuition 
ahead of expenditures less related to universities’ educational missions, 
such as adding luxury facilities and other costly amenities to their 
campuses. It is not that schools would be unable to undertake such 
projects; rather, they would merely need to ensure that students were not 
forced to pay higher tuition prices in order to fund them. 
At the same time, this proposal would still allow for significant 
endowment accumulation. This is important not only because 
universities claim it is necessary to provide equivalent services to future 
students,169 but also because it is unlikely that any legislation could 
 
surveyed were less than one percent of their respective endowments. Id. at 13–14. 
 164. See 26 U.S.C. § 11(b) (2012). 
 165. See supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text. 
 166. As one commentator has suggested, for example, the tax revenue could be distributed pro 
rata to institutions with endowments below a certain base level. Allen, supra note 119. “The college 
with the lowest per student endowment would get the highest share.” Id. This would be a better use 
of the money than earmarking it for federal grants or financial aid, since such programs can create 
incentives for schools to increase tuition rates. See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text. 
 167. Allen, supra note 119. 
 168. See supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text. 
 169. See Tobin, supra note 53, at 427 (“The trustees of an endowed institution are the 
guardians of the future against the claims of the present.”). 
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remove higher education’s preoccupation with endowment growth. 
Proposals that attempt to do so create awkward internal conflicts.170 
This leads to perhaps the most persuasive argument in support of this 
solution: it helps universities more closely align their behavior with 
principles of intergenerational equity. If higher-education institutions are 
“immortal,” as Tobin suggests,171 they have a legitimate interest in 
saving for the future. Thus, it is important not to cut off their ability to 
preserve and even build endowment corpus. At the same time, 
intergenerational equity seems to demand that endowment building not 
result in decreased educational access for current students.172 In fact, if 
anything, endowment policies should reflect a preference for present 
students because history has shown that donations are likely to continue 
to flow into university coffers in the future,173 and prosperity should 
increase among later generations.174 Linking an endowment tax to tuition 
appropriately shifts the focus to current students by ensuring that 
universities will not grow rich at their expense. On the other hand, it 
maintains a healthy intergenerational balance by allowing for endowment 
building once the school ensures that current students will pay no more 
for their education, in real dollars, than their predecessors. 
C. Criticisms and Counterarguments 
It is difficult to predict all possible criticisms of this proposal, 
because it has received little attention in legal literature. Nonetheless, it 
seems likely that opponents would focus on the issues addressed below. 
While this solution would not fully resolve all concerns, as this 
discussion illustrates, the arguments supporting this tax are strong 
enough to merit further consideration among policymakers. 
 
 170. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. 
 171. See Tobin, supra note 53, at 427. 
 172. If well-endowed schools that cut operational budgets during recessions “violate[] the 
intergenerational equity pledge,” logic would suggest that schools commit the same violation when 
they raise tuition by more than inflation, especially if they do so while their wealth—and 
consequently their capacity to serve the needs of future students—is growing. Conti-Brown, supra 
note 13, at 708; see also supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. 
 173. See Hansmann, supra note 13, at 16 (“[T]here is no reason to ignore the prospect of 
future gifts to endowment in undertaking an intergenerational welfare analysis.”). 
 174. See id. at 14 (“There is every reason to believe that, over the long run, the economy will 
continue to grow in the future as it has in the past and that future generations of students will 
therefore be, on average, more prosperous than students are today. . . . Thus . . . it would seem more 
equitable to have future generations subsidize the present.”). 
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1. Effect on needy students 
Critics might argue that by keeping tuition rates low, this proposal 
could actually hurt the nation’s neediest students. Many institutions fund 
financial aid packages for the indigent with money paid by those wealthy 
enough to afford their school’s full sticker price.175 Well-endowed 
colleges raise tuition rates regularly, the argument goes, but only the 
wealthiest students and families receive no financial aid.176 Thus, 
opponents could claim that reducing the price of admission at the top end 
will simply leave less money available for other students. 
There are two problems with this analysis, however. First, the rising 
number of college graduates burdened by excessive student loan debt 
suggests that if universities are doling out financial aid to students in 
need, 177 they are either not giving enough or leaving a large segment of 
their students—most likely from middle-class families—unaided.178 If 
tying an endowment tax to tuition means slightly less financial aid for 
those who could have otherwise attended school tuition-free, it should 
also mean lower tuition costs—and therefore less student-loan debt—for 
those with just enough income to be ignored by current financial-aid 
programs.179 
Second, the combination of increased tuition rates and less-than-
transparent financial-aid practices makes the task of financing a college 
education an unnecessarily confusing one for many families. As one 
 
 175. See Kevin Kiley, Occupy Someone Else, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Dec. 9, 2011, 3:00 AM), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/12/09/public-universities-question-why-they-not-
lawmakers-are-protesters-target (“Essentially, wealthy students who pay full tuition subsidize the 
cost of educating low-income students.”). 
 176. The University of California, for example, will cover the full cost of tuition and fees for 
students who are California residents and come from families earning less than $80,000 per year. 
The Blue+Gold Opportunity Plan, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (Nov. 18, 2010), 
http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/admissions/paying-for-uc/financial-aid/grants/blue-
gold/files/blueandgold_factsheet_11_Eng.pdf. 
 177. A 2010 study showed that only about one-third of college students graduate without debt 
(and the fraction may be even smaller when factoring in the number of parents who borrow to pay 
for their children’s education). Tamar Lewin, College Graduates’ Debt Burden Grew, Yet Again, in 
2010, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/education/average-student-
loan-debt-grew-by-5-percent-in-2010.html. For the two-thirds who do take out student loans, the 
average debt load has surged to a record high of $25,250 per graduate. Id. 
 178. See Kiley, supra note 175 (“[O]nly a handful of institutions meet full need for all 
students, and even those . . . campuses that try to meet need for low-income student[s] still leave 
many squeezed in the middle.”). 
 179. Universities, of course, would be free to use more endowment income to make up the 
difference for the students they believe are hurt by the tax. 
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observer lamented, “colleges have adopted complicated aid programs 
and discounts that have made the pricing of an undergraduate education 
at an elite college as complicated and varied as the pricing of airline 
seats.”180 The effects of this reality go well beyond mere annoyance. For 
instance, as Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) has pointed out, high 
tuition prices cause “[s]tudents from low-income families [to] fear they 
won’t be able to afford college, some so much that they don’t even 
apply.”181 Even if linking an endowment tax to tuition reduces financial 
aid, if the tax fosters more transparency from colleges regarding the true 
costs of an education, it could actually increase the number of low-
income students who attend. 
2. Tuition increases during recessions 
Another potential criticism is that this tax would encourage tuition 
hikes during economic downturns. That is, while the tax may help keep 
costs down when endowments are growing, some might argue that 
universities will seek to make up for this by raising rates when 
endowments shrink. 
Admittedly, the tax would do nothing to discourage tuition increases 
during years of shrinking endowment funds, but it is important to note 
that universities already have track records of drastically raising their 
rates during recessions. In fact, one study has shown that “[t]he steepest 
increases in public college and university tuition have been imposed 
during times of greatest economic hardship.”182 From 2008 to 2009, for 
example, just as Americans were feeling the effects of “the once in a 
century financial crisis,”183 published tuition and fees increased 6.5% at 
both public four-year institutions and private for-profit institutions and 
4.4% at private not-for-profit schools, despite a 2.1% drop in the 
Consumer Price Index over the same period.184 Higher-education 
institutions raised their rates by similar percentages from 2009 to 
 
 180. Arenson, supra note 144, at 2. 
 181. Grassley Press Release 2, supra note 106. 
 182. NAT’L CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y AND HIGHER EDUC., LOSING GROUND: A NATIONAL 
STATUS REPORT ON THE AFFORDABILITY OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 4 (2002), available at 
http://www.highereducation.org/reports/losing_ground/affordability_report_final.pdf. 
 183. Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 709 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 184. SANDY BAUM & JENNIFER MA, COLL. BD. ADVOCACY & POLICY CTR., TRENDS IN 
COLLEGE PRICING 2009, at 2 (2009), available at http://trends.collegeboard.org/ 
downloads/archives/CP_2009.pdf. 
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2010.185 Linking an endowment tax to tuition may not discourage rising 
costs during economic downturns, but it seems unlikely to create 
problems that students do not already face under the current system. 
Of course, some might argue that tuition increases would simply be 
more severe as a result of the tax,186 but variations in endowment 
performance should militate against this possibility. At the end of the 
2008 fiscal year, for example, twenty-six of the nation’s forty wealthiest 
universities reported that their endowments grew over the previous 
twelve months, despite the recession being in full force.187 Under the 
proposal suggested here, these schools would have been forced to limit 
tuition increases, which may have prompted poorer-performing schools 
to do the same. 
Moreover, at some point, extreme tuition hikes do more damage than 
good for colleges’ bottom line. Research has shown that “[h]igher 
education is like most goods and services in our economy—as its price 
rises, individuals are likely to consume less of it.”188 In fact, according to 
one recent study, “especially large tuition increases elicit 
disproportionate enrollment responses.”189 These responses have not 
 
 185. See SANDY BAUM & JENNIFER MA, COLL. BD. ADVOCACY & POLICY CTR., TRENDS IN 
COLLEGE PRICING 2010, at 3, 9 (2010), available at http://www.naicu.edu/docLib/ 
20101027_CollBd2010Pricing.pdf (noting that in-state and out-of-state tuition at four-year public 
universities rose by 7.9% and 6.0%, respectively, while tuition at private schools rose by 4.5%, all 
despite a meager 1.2% increase in the CPI). 
 186. In a related vein, critics might argue that if Congress enacted this proposal, universities 
would respond by raising tuition in accordance with inflation every year, regardless of their 
operational needs. The tax obviously does nothing to preclude this possibility, but it should not 
necessarily be considered a negative result. If drastic tuition increases violate principles of 
intergenerational equity, see supra note 172, one could argue that real decreases in the cost of 
attendance do the same. In any case, given current trends in higher education, regular tuition 
increases that mirror inflation would actually represent a vast improvement for most students in 
terms of the overall affordability of a college degree. See BAUM & MA, supra note 4, at 3 (noting 
that over the past decade, published tuition and fees have increased at an average rate of 5.6%, 3.8%, 
and 2.6% beyond the rate of inflation at public four-year schools, public two-year colleges, and 
private four-year institutions, respectively). 
 187. NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. & UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS & COMMONFUND INST., 2008 NACUBO 
ENDOWMENT STUDY, ALL INSTITUTIONS LISTED BY FISCAL YEAR 2008 MARKET VALUE OF 
ENDOWMENT ASSETS WITH PERCENTAGE CHANGE BETWEEN 2007 AND 2008 ENDOWMENT ASSETS 
1 (2009), available at http://www.nacubo.org/documents/research/NES2008PublicTable-AllInstituti 
onsByFY08MarketValue.pdf. 
 188. DONALD E. HELLER, EDFUND, THE EFFECTS OF TUITION PRICES AND FINANCIAL AID ON 
ENROLLMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION: CALIFORNIA AND THE NATION 8 (2001), available at 
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/resources/education/ed2020_docs/Heller-
effects_of_tuition_and_financial_aid_-_pdf.pdf. 
 189. Steven W. Hemelt & Dave E. Marcotte, The Impact of Tuition Increases on Enrollment 
at Public Colleges and Universities, 33 EDUC. EVALUATION AND POL’Y ANALYSIS 435, 435 (2011). 
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been significant enough to stop universities from raising tuition, but they 
could act as a cap on the most severe increases. 
3. Donor restrictions tie up endowment funds for purposes unrelated to 
tuition 
Opponents might also argue that some universities would be unable 
to avoid the tax because too much of their endowments are restricted for 
purposes unrelated to tuition. In fact, higher-education institutions have 
long pointed to this argument as a reason for not spending more of their 
wealth to increase educational access.190 
As mentioned above, however, research suggests that donor 
restrictions do not meaningfully restrain endowment spending.191 Studies 
show, for example, that 45% of endowment funds at private universities 
and 20% at public institutions are unrestricted.192 Even ignoring the 
portions of restricted endowment that are designated for financial aid or 
tuition-related purposes,193 this should leave most colleges and 
universities with more than enough money to keep tuition in line with 
inflation. As one study noted, “small additional distributions from 
institutions’ endowments”—in some cases as little as one-half of one 
percent of the total endowment value—“could mitigate or eliminate 
tuition growth” at many universities.194 
Of course, a few schools have endowments with much larger 
percentages of restricted funds,195 but this reality raises an important 
 
 190. See Conti-Brown, supra note 13, at 722 (“Many have argued that . . . restrictions keep 
universities from spending their endowments as liberally as they would like . . . .”); Waldeck, supra 
note 8, at 1808 (“Even if an institution wanted to . . . provide free tuition for every student, it could 
not tap all of its endowment to do so; some of the funds would be restricted for . . . uses that are far 
removed from free tuition.”). 
 191. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 192. Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1808–09 (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. & UNIV. BUS. 
OFFICERS & COMMONFUND INST., 2006 NACUBO ENDOWMENT STUDY 61–90 (2007), available at 
http://www.nacubo.org). 
 193. According to one study, “financial aid is the number one restriction chosen by donors—
outpacing all other areas, including research, athletics, and faculty salaries combined.” Lynne 
Munson, Endowment Reform: Why Universities Should Share Their Vast Wealth and in the Process 
Make Higher Education More Affordable, in UNIVERSITY ENDOWMENT REFORM: A DIALOGUE 12 
(2008), available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams /20599.pdf. 
 194. GRAVELLE MEMORANDUM, supra note 118, at 12. 
 195. At the University of Texas, for example, only 0.5% of the institution’s multi-billion-
dollar endowment is unrestricted. Charles Miller, Endowment Reform: Why Federal Mandatory 
Payouts Are Unnecessary, Legally Dubious, and Counterproductive to Larger Higher Education 
Reform, in UNIVERSITY ENDOWMENT REFORM: A DIALOGUE 9 (2008), available at 
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/20599.pdf. 
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point about university fundraising. Scholars tend to agree that schools 
have significant influence over the restrictions that donors apply to 
gifts.196 As an example, economist Richard Vedder points to a recent 
donation by former eBay CEO Meg Whitman, who helped Princeton 
University build a residential facility with a price tag of more than 
$300,000 per bed—“roughly the cost of a luxury hotel of the Ritz-
Carlton variety.”197 Whitman could have restricted the money for tuition 
assistance, but as Vedder explains, “Princeton no doubt told her ‘we need 
this luxury facility to help lure students here that would otherwise go to 
Harvard or Yale.’”198 A tuition-triggered endowment tax may force 
schools to modify their fundraising practices, but in many cases this 
would lead to both increased educational access and more efficient use of 
society’s resources. 
4. Tying the tax to tuition ignores the importance of research 
Critics could argue that tying the tax solely to tuition ignores the 
valuable contribution that endowment income makes to vital research 
programs. Along with instructing students, conducting research has 
traditionally been viewed as one of the central functions of higher 
education,199 and the schools with the largest endowments are usually 
the ones that support the most research.200 Opponents may fear that as 
more endowment income is directed toward keeping tuition costs low, 
universities will feel compelled to cut funding for important research-
related initiatives. 
To the extent that this fear exists, however, it seems largely 
 
 196. See, e.g., Waldeck, supra note 8, at 1809 (“[T]here is reason to suspect . . . that the 
restrictions are partially of the university’s own making.”); Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Christopher L. 
Smith, The Sources and Uses of Annual Giving at Private Research Universities 5 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8307, 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8307 
(“[T]he major private research universities devote considerable resources to cultivating donors and 
‘shaping’ their giving preferences.”). 
 197. VEDDER, supra note 107, at 20. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See, e.g., John Hattie & H.W. Marsh, The Relationship Between Research and Teaching: 
A Meta-Analysis, 66 REV. EDUC. RES. 507, 507 (1996) (“The claim that universities exist for 
teaching and research seems incontrovertible to many . . . .”). 
 200. For example, of the twenty-five top American research universities, as ranked by The 
Center for Measuring University Performance, twenty-four have endowments worth more than $1 
billion. ELIZABETH D. CAPALDI ET AL., CTR. FOR MEASURING UNIV. PERFORMANCE, THE TOP 
AMERICAN RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (2010), available at 
http://mup.asu.edu/research2010.pdf. Of course, that is due in part to the fact that “endowment 
assets” are included as one of the nine measures the center uses to rank the institutions. Id. at 15. 
6.WILLIE.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2013 2:58 PM 
1665 Taxing and Tuition 
 1699 
misplaced. Because the tax would be assessed only when endowment 
wealth increases, it would not encourage—much less force—universities 
to reduce financial support for current research programs. Of course, it 
may inhibit schools’ ability to save for additional future research, but 
only to the extent that they would otherwise have prioritized funding for 
research above funding for tuition. Such a limitation, while potentially 
controversial, seems consistent with higher education’s tax-exempt 
purposes. Colleges and universities qualify for preferential tax treatment 
because they are “educational” institutions,201 not research 
laboratories.202 
Moreover, while there is little doubt that research enjoys a strong 
connection to classroom instruction,203 it seems appropriate for tax law 
to prioritize educational access above research funding. Not only does 
the demand for education provide financial support for research, but, to a 
large degree, research at a university is made meaningful only because of 
its relationship to students’ education. That is not to say that students are 
the only consumers of research; in fact, the opposite is somewhat true.204 
As education becomes more expensive, however, the pool of potential 
future researchers is likely to get smaller,205 and research can be 
 
 201. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
 202. It is possible that a university’s research could help it qualify for tax exemption as a 
“scientific” organization under § 501(c)(3). See James T.Y. Yang, Note, Collaboration Between 
Nonprofit Universities and Commercial Enterprises: The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit 
Universities from Federal Income Taxation, 95 YALE L.J. 1857, 1863 n.37 (1986) (“Research 
activities undertaken by organizations organized and operated primarily for educational purpose may 
also qualify as scientific activities.”). But the increasing tendency among universities to direct their 
scientific research toward the corporate sphere has prompted scholars to raise questions regarding 
their tax-exempt status. See, e.g., JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE 
CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 167 (2005) (“[T]he question of whether such 
aggressive, market-oriented behavior is consistent with university’s nonprofit mission, and truly 
warrants public subsidy, is an important one.”). 
 203. Ruth Neumann, Perceptions of the Teaching-Research Nexus: A Framework for Analysis, 
23 HIGHER EDUC. 159, 161 (1992) (noting agreement among a sample of academics regarding the 
nexus between teaching and research and the tendency of the two to merge); W. Edwards Deming, 
Letter to the Editor, Memorandum on Teaching, 26 AM. STAT. 47, 47 (1972) (“He who does no 
research possesses not knowledge and has nothing to teach.”); cf. Hattie & Marsh, supra note 199, at 
533 (“It would be difficult to imagine today’s university-level teachers not being aware of recent 
research, although whether they have to also generate this research to be effective teachers is very 
much questioned by . . . studies on the relationship between teaching and research.”). 
 204. See Risa L. Lieberwitz, The Marketing of Higher Education: The Price of the 
University’s Soul, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 763, 779–81 (2004) (reviewing DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES 
IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2003) (describing the 
increasing corporate consumption of research)). 
 205. See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text. 
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expected to increasingly target corporate, rather than educational, 
interests.206 In the long run, higher education will benefit from a policy 
that encourages universities to save for future research at a pace that does 
not interfere with educational access. 
5. Universities depend on state funding 
Perhaps the most persuasive argument against linking an endowment 
tax to tuition is that public universities are essentially dependent on state 
funding to meet their operational goals.207 In fact, in many states, tuition 
rates are set by legislatures or state boards of education, not university 
trustees.208 Even in states where schools enjoy more autonomy, critics 
might argue that a cut in government support could essentially compel 
the majority of these schools to raise tuition despite their own best efforts 
to increase efficiency. An endowment tax that punishes a university for 
decisions it cannot control could thus be viewed as unfair. 
While this concern should not be lightly dismissed, it should also not 
be overblown. The tax would likely force legislatures to accept more 
responsibility for the costs of higher education, especially in states where 
schools lack control over tuition rates. Many observers would consider 
this a positive change.209 Moreover, the onus should not be placed 
entirely on state governments. Universities often create arguably 
unnecessary challenges for legislators by making questionable financial 
decisions, particularly when it comes to compensating administrators.210 
 
 206. See Blumberg, supra note 100, at 91 (“The fear is that in time universities will resemble 
nothing more than commercial research centers.”). 
 207. See Hill, supra note 14, at 600 (“Universities could not meet their operating expenses 
without government grants. Universities lobby actively for government funding.”). 
 208. ASS’N OF AM. UNIVS., MYTHS ABOUT COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ENDOWMENTS 2 
(2009), available at http://www.aau.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=7792. 
 209. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y AND HIGHER EDUC., RESPONDING TO THE CRISIS 
IN COLLEGE OPPORTUNITY 2 (2004) [hereinafter CRISIS IN COLLEGE OPPORTUNITY], available at 
http://www.highereducation.org/reports/crisis/crisis.pdf (“[S]tate leaders must invest significant time 
and attention to plan for the future of higher education opportunity. No other entity—not the colleges 
and universities, not the students and the families—can effectively address these issues without the 
sustained attention of governors and legislators.”); NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
TRANSFORMING HIGHER EDUCATION: NATIONAL IMPERATIVE—STATE RESPONSIBILITY 4 (2006), 
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/other/Funding_Higher_Ed/2007 July9_NCSL.pdf (“[L]egislators 
have played a role in creating the crisis in higher education. Specifically, legislators have not made 
strategic budget and appropriations decisions, have not set clear statewide goals for higher 
education, and have not exerted strong leadership on higher education issues.”). 
 210. See Kevin Kiley, College Presidents’ Paychecks Raise Brows, USATODAY.COM (Jul. 19, 
2011, 2:29 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2011-07-19-college-president-pay-
increase_n.htm (describing several examples of controversial compensation decisions). 
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When University of California regents blamed a $1,818 per-student 
tuition increase on state funding cuts in 2011, for example, opponents 
criticized the regents for handing out massive pay raises to several 
university executives, including a $195,000 raise to an employee of UC 
San Francisco’s medical center.211 A similar controversy surrounded 
tuition hikes within the California State University system, which elected 
to pay one of its new university presidents $100,000 more per year than 
his predecessor.212 As one state legislator commented, “[f]or those of us 
who fight for every nickel to help our kids, [the universities] make it very 
difficult.”213 If schools faced the threat of an endowment tax, legislators 
and trustees may be more willing to compromise—and ultimately benefit 
students in the process. 
In any case, because the tax is triggered only by endowment growth, 
universities suffering from state funding cuts would generally not be at 
risk of paying it. Government support for higher education traditionally 
fluctuates in “‘boom and bust’ cycles” that coincide with changes in the 
overall economy.214 Thus, legislatures are most likely to cut funding 
during periods when endowments are least likely to grow. In the rare 
instance that this is not the case, it seems hypocritical for schools to 
accumulate endowment income while simultaneously blaming tuition 
increases on the loss of state support. In fact, in such cases, an 
endowment tax could be useful in discouraging colleges and universities 
from using legislative decisions as an excuse to shift the burden of 
profligate spending onto students. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The controversy surrounding the steadily increasing price tag of 
higher education has intensified in recent years, as universities’ wealth 
has ballooned to record proportions. Commentators have suggested 
numerous proposals for legislative reform, all designed to encourage 
schools to spend more of their endowment income on current students. 
Unfortunately, most of these proposals would do little to increase 
educational access for students, and in the worst cases, they could 
 
 211. Larry Gordon, Regents Approve UC Tuition Hike, LATIMES.COM (Jul. 15, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/15/local/la-me-uc-tuition-20110715. 
 212. Carla Rivera, Salary Plan for San Diego State President Stirs Furor, LATIMES.COM (Jul. 
9, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/09/local/la-me-calstate-salary-20110709. 
 213. Id. 
 214. CRISIS IN COLLEGE OPPORTUNITY, supra note 209, at 2. 
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actually foster wasteful spending. 
Legislation in this area must walk a fine line, discouraging practices 
that make college less affordable but supporting endowment building 
activities that are consistent with the principles of intergenerational 
equity. Unlike other proposals, linking an endowment tax to tuition lives 
up to this ideal; while encouraging universities to use more of their 
wealth to increase educational access, the tax would still leave room for 
significant endowment accumulation. 
Ultimately, a single endowment tax cannot solve the complicated 
issue of higher-education affordability. That does not mean, however, 
that Congress should exclude it as a potential option. Although the tax 
discussed in this Comment would likely attract opposition from colleges 
and universities, the unique advantages it offers make it worthy of 
additional consideration. 
Matt Willie
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